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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
James Darnell Black appeals from

on a

his sentence

of ﬁve years ﬁxed following a conviction

guilty plea for criminal possession of a ﬁnancial transaction card.

the district court abused

Of The

Facts

argues 0n appeal that

sentencing discretion by inadequately considering his intellectual

its

disability as a factor at sentencing

Statement

He

and by imposing a Wholly ﬁxed sentence.

And Course Of The Proceedings

The Idaho Court 0f Appeals has twice resolved appeals ﬁled by James Darnell Black
regarding his sentence in this matter.

2017) (hereinafter, “Black

I”);

E

392 P.3d 45

(Ct.

App.

WL 4940310

(Ct.

App.

State V. Black, 161 Idaho 867,

State V. Black,

Docket N0. 45316, 2018

Oct. 12, 2018) (unpublished) (hereinafter, “BlLkII’ﬂ.

The underlying

facts are set out in

both

cases.

Ofﬁcers discovered that Black unlawfully obtained credit card information from a several
individuals and

P.3d

at 46.

He was

stolen property

also charged

was using

that information t0

make

purchases.

m,

161 Idaho at 868, 392

charged by information with ﬁve counts of grand theft by possession of

and ﬁve counts of criminal possession of a ﬁnancial transaction

by information

as a persistent Violator under

LC.

card. Li.

He was

§ 19-25 14. Li.

“Pursuant to a plea agreement, Black pled guilty to one count 0f criminal possession of a
ﬁnancial transaction card, I.C. §§

remaining charges against Black.”

18-3125, 18-3128. In exchange, the State dismissed the

Li.

After the district court accepted his plea, Black told the

presentence investigator that he “considered his mental health status serious.”

P.3d

at

47

(internal quotation

marks omitted). “He reported

t0

Li

at 869,

392

having been previously diagnosed

with anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder and to

He

one previous suicide attempt.” Li

had previously received treatment, including having been admitted

also claimed that he

psychiatric institution.

at least

Li.

“A

t0 a

certiﬁed counselor with the Department of Health and Welfare

then prepared a mental health examination report pursuant to LC. § 19-2524. In that report, the

counselor acknowledged that Black

may have

a serious mental illness.” Li.

“Before sentencing, Black ﬁled a pro se motion for a psychological evaluation pursuant t0

LC.

§

19-2522.”

He

Li.

“argued that his mental condition would be a signiﬁcant factor

at

sentencing because he suffers from mild mental retardation, depression, bipolar disorder,
paranoia, and anxiety.” Li. Black’s counsel then ﬁled a motion requesting the

The

district court

same

relief.

Li.

denied the motion, stating: “The Court has n0 reason t0 believe that the

Defendant’s mental condition will be a signiﬁcant factor

at sentencing.

In addition,

good cause

has not been shown.” Li. Black was sentenced to ﬁve years ﬁxed. Li.

On

appeal, Black argued that the district court erred

by denying

his request for a

psychological evaluation under LC. § 19-2522 and by imposing an excessive sentence.
868, 392 P.3d at 46.

court erred

available to

The Court of Appeals reached only

by denying
it

Li. at

the ﬁrst issue, holding that the district

his request for a psychological evaluation because the information

provided reason t0 believe his mental health would be a signiﬁcant issue

at

sentencing. Li. at 871, 392 P.3d at 49.

On

remand, the same

WL 49403 10, at *2.

The

disabled,” “possesses a

district

judge ordered a psychological evaluation.

evaluator, Dr.

10W

Chad Sombke, found

level of psychopathy,”

that

Black

“is

BlLkH, 2018

mildly intellectually

and “his drug addiction appears

to

have taken

over his

(Sombke

life.”

Eval., pp. 8-9.1)

He

Black would engage in

stated that the risk that

future Violent crime “appears to be 10W, but his risk t0 engage in other general criminal behaviors

appears to be high.” (Sombke Eval., p.

9.)

He

therefore

abuse treatment and remain drug and alcohol

free, that

recommended Black

receive substance

he continue taking his mental health

medications in prison, and that he undergo programming to address his criminal behavior.

At

sentencing, the district court again imposed a

On
it

“failed t0 appropriately

weigh and consider

mental condition and Dr. Sombke’s evaluation that
court stated, ‘That evaluation

judge

M,

2018

WL

appeal again, Black argued that the district court imposed an excessive sentence
his mental health issues.”

Court of Appeals agreed based 0n several statements from the

instance;

years.

at *3.

4940310,

because

ﬁxed sentence of ﬁve

(Id.)

it

isn’t

now

that

at resentencing).

any reason

why

I

is

it

district

it,

determined t0 be problematic. “The

combed over

it

twice.’”

The

judge regarding Black’s

not a signiﬁcant factor at sentencing.

have read

Li. at *1.

Li. at

It

district

wasn’t in the ﬁrst

*5 (quoting the

district

But, according to the Court 0f Appeals, the district court did not identify

Black’s mental condition was not a signiﬁcant factor at sentencing.

Court 0f Appeals concluded

that, “It

appears the district court understood What

it

Li.

The

had a duty

t0

do--c0nsider Black’s mental health as an important sentencing factor--but declined to d0 so. This
constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Li.

1

In an Order

At the same

Augmenting Appeals dated March

time, the Court of Appeals

1,

was

also “careful

2019, this Court augmented the appellate

record With the records and transcripts from three prior appeals: Nos. 44191-2016 (Black

45316-2017 (Black

I),

and 45943-2018 (an appeal from the denial of a motion for credit for time
2.) Dr. Sombke’s evaluation is included
the appellate record of 453 16-2017 (Black II) in a ﬁle titled “Black 45316 eval.pdf” and will
II),

served that was voluntarily dismissed by Black). (R., p.
in

be referred t0 herein as “Sombke Eval.”
pages of the pdf document as a whole.

Page references

to

Sombke

Eval. correspond t0 the

t0 clarify that although a district court has

factor at sentencing,

we do

Instead, “mental health

factors

not

mean

an obligation t0 consider mental health as a signiﬁcant

that mental health

end, and after weighing

all

is

evidence of mental health issues.”

the factors, the district court

in individualizing a sentence.”

most heavily weighted

factor but that does not

mean

57.2)

At a

status hearing

is

0n December

2018, the

6,

may be

that a defendant’s long history

the

of mental

Li

t0 a different district judge.

district

“In the

conclude that other factors weigh

insigniﬁcant or unimportant.”

was assigned

again, resentencing

may

Li.

“For example, protecting society

Li.

health issues and a diagnosis 0f mental retardation

On remand

greatest weight.” Li.

must be weighed With the other relevant and signiﬁcant 0r important

and cannot be disregarded When there

more heavily

must be given the

(R., pp. 53-

judge noted that she had “read the

decisions of the court of appeals,” “looked at the evaluations that were previously done and the

19-2522 by Dr. Sombke,” and understood the Court of Appeals “t0 be saying
mental health conditions and potential intellectual

--

[that]

potential disabilities are,

Mr. Black’s

and should be, a

signiﬁcant factor at sentencing, and that the sentencing judge failed to take those things into

account.”

(12/6/18 Tr., p.

performed

tests

5, Ls.

7-21.)

She then expressed concern

that Dr.

Sombke had

not

designed t0 most accurately measure intellectual functioning and suggested

securing a second evaluation that she could review along with Dr. Sombke’s report. (12/6/ 1 8 Tr.,

p. 6, L. 5

—

p. 7, L. 18.)

Neither party had any objection.

any medical or mental health records

that

2

She also asked Black

were relevant and indicated

presentence investigator to submit an update.
reiterated that, in her View, the Court

(Id.)

(12/6/18 Tr., p.

8, L.

6

—

that she

t0

submit

would ask the

p. 9, L. 7.)

She again

0f Appeals’ decision indicated that Black’s mental health

Black moved to disqualify the ﬁrst judge

t0

whom the matter was reassigned,

reassigned again to Senior District Court Judge Cheri Copsey. (R., pp. 53-57.)

after

Which

it

was

“is

a signiﬁcant factor,” not simply that

information.” (12/6/18 Tr., p. 9, L. 8

— p.

it

“could be,” and so they needed

“all

10, L. 8.)

The second psychological evaluation was completed by Dr. Melinda Jorgensen.
3-123)

She determined

that

Scale IQ score of 67. (PSI, p.

Black suffered from a “mild

8.)

She noted

When he was

beginning

,”

that

intellectual disability,”

(PSI, pp.

with a Full

he had a “long history 0f abusing crack cocaine

Which addiction has “created occupational dysﬁmction,”

“impairs his judgment and decision making abilities,” and causes

distrust others.” (PSI, pp. 8-9.) But, she noted,

(PSI, p. 9.)

of the

he

is

him

t0 feel “paranoid

“currently in remission while living in jail.”

She also diagnosed him With major depressive disorder, Without psychotic

and generalized anxiety disorder, both of Which have been treated over the course of his

features,

She recommended

that

With

life

psychotherapy and medication, and which were being treated while he was incarcerated.
pp. 9, 11.)

and

(PSI,

Black receive “intensive and long-term individual and group

counseling services While incarcerated,” as well as “any programming that focuses 0n developing
adaptive functioning

problem solving

skills,

skills.”

complex problem

(PSI, p. 10.)

solving,

and social comprehension and social

She further recommended

that

he continue his “current

medication regimen while incarcerated t0 reduce symptoms 0f depression and anxiety.” (PSI,

11.)

She noted

that

he needed “long-term, chemical dependency treatment that includes

monitoring for abstinence and relapse prevention.”

moderate

3

t0 high risk for recidivism

(Id.)

Finally, she

among

concluded that Black

of a non-Violent crime involving

References to “PSI” are t0 the conﬁdential exhibits in the ﬁle

including,

p.

theft

titled

and fraud,” but

“is a

that

“Black 46802 psi.pdf,”

other documents, the report 0f Dr. Jorgensen (PSI, pp. 3-12), the original

presentence report (PSI, pp. 42-69), as well as a ﬁle review conducted by the presentence
investigator just prior to Black’s most recent sentencing (PSI, pp. 1-2).

of recidivism could be reduced by chemical dependency and mental health treatment.

his risk

(PSI, p. 12.)

At

resentencing, the district court judge ﬁrst emphasized that she had not reviewed the

previous sentencing transcripts so as not t0 be “tainted” by the previous judge’s Views. (2/21/19
Tr., p. 18, Ls. 19-24.)

making

district court,

After the attorneys presented argument, Black extensively addressed the

relatively sophisticated legal

arguments and citing a variety 0f cases.

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 24, L. 7 —p. 35, L. 17.)

The

district

and deterrence, but not on

rehabilitation,

She noted
here

-- I

judge

is

judge stated that her sentence was based 0n the protection 0f society,

that

retribution.

“Where a defendant’s mental condition

agree with the Court of Appeals

also required to

Tr., p. 40, Ls. 9-15.)

weigh

that

it is

that she

Sombke and

in that case the sentencing

(2/21/19

Jorgensen.

{2/21/19 Tr., p. 38,

19-25230) regarding the relevance of mental

Sombke and

Jorgensen] paid careful

and in assessing what the Court

of the requirements of§ 19-2523.” (2/21/19

State V. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836,

--

it is

had carefully reviewed the medical and mental

set out in I.C. §

attention t0 the requirements 0f § 19-2523,

all

p. 40, L. 8.)

a signiﬁcant issue, Which clearly

health at sentencing and stated, “both 0f the clinicians [Drs.

applied

—

mental condition as a sentencing consideration.”

She emphasized

She recited the factors

is

a signiﬁcant issue

health records, as well as the evaluations from Drs.

Ls. 2-21.)

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 39, L. 18

Tr., p. 40, L.

264 P.3d 935, 943 (2011),

16

is

—

going to d0, Ihave

p. 41, L. 6.)

Citing

State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,

461, 50 P.3d 472, 476 (2002), and State V. Quintana, 155 Idaho 124, 130, 306 P.3d 209, 215 (Ct.

App. 2013), she noted
at sentencing,

it

that While a defendant’s

need not be the controlling

mental health

factor.

is

a factor that should be considered

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 41, L. 7

— p.

42, L. 3.)

After again re-emphasizing that Black’s mental health was a factor she was considering
(TL, p. 42, Ls. 4-5), the district judge then spent roughly nine pages discussing Black’s mental
condition, substance abuse, and the evaluations conducted

She concluded

(2/21/19 Tr., pp. 42-50).

intellectual disability,

and

was being kept

prison,

less likely

clean,

Black has a substance abuse problem, a mild

from depression and anxiety, he was receiving treatment

and the longer

was so

that

the better off Black

The

district

— p.

50, L. 16.)

She noted

that

he was assigned an LSI of 38, “one of the highest areas 0f re-offense.”

—

p. 51, L. 2.)

She noted

counts and a persistent Violator enhancement,

state in association

With his plea.

all

that the instant case

had

Oregon and Ohio, which history

She then extensively discussed

(2/21/19 TL, p. 51, Ls. 3-9.)

indicates that Black has

from people,” and “[t]he only time

he’s incarcerated.”

{2/21/19 Tr., p. 60, L. 23

“stopped counting [the number of crimes]

The

district

—

at

it

—

“made

pending charges in

p. 64. L. 18.)

a career out of offending and

appears that [Black]

p. 61, L. 4;

ﬂ alﬂ

80 charges.” (2/21/19

is

When

PSI, pp. 47-57.)

She

is

not stealing

Tr., p. 63, Ls. 5-13.)

judge then reiterated that the sentence she was imposing was based 0n the

t0 protect society, t0 deter future criminal conduct,

rehabilitation, but

18

that

in fact involved ten

but one count of which were dismissed by the

his criminal history spanning three decades, at least eleven states, with

need

would be and the

judge then turned t0 Black’s extensive criminal history and his high risk t0

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 50, L. 17

stealing

in

he would be t0 return t0 his long history 0f crime and substance abuse When released.

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 49, L. 21

reoffend.

suffers

that While

by Drs. Sombke and Jorgensen

and

was not based 0n considerations involving

to provide

retribution.

an opportunity for

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 61, L.

In particular, she stated that a lengthier term 0f imprisonment

was important

“because during that time in his best interest he will be able t0 further stabilize his mental health,

he Will be able t0 have further sobriety.” (2/21/19
“get[s] close to being released,

because that

Tr., p. 63, Ls. 18-22.)

going to happen, then there’s a

is

that they offer t0 people to help maintain both that sobriety

—

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 63, L. 22

criminal system.”

In addition, as Black

p. 64, L.

and

1.)

lot

t0 avoid getting

“So

I

ﬁnd

of programs

back

into the

that looking at he’s

receiving the appropriate medical and mental health treatment for his depression and anxiety, he

is

going to be able t0 continue to be clean and sober and ultimately

interest to help

Ls. 6-11.)

him

so that

When he

is

released, he Will be able t0 maintain.”

“Moreover, because he tends to be

gets proper treatment.”

all this

transient, releasing

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 64, Ls. 11-13.)

ﬁxed, With 1,425 days of credit for time served. (2/21/19

Black timely ﬁled a notice of appeal.

him

would be

in his best

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 64,

early will not ensure he

She then sentenced Black

t0

ﬁve years

Tr., p. 65, Ls. 1-10; R., pp. 78-81.4)

(R., pp. 82-84.)

He

subsequently ﬁled a motion

under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 requesting a reduction in his sentence and arguing that the

district

court had not adequately consider his mental condition at sentencing (Aug. R., pp. 1-6), including

a long, hand-written document in which Black again makes fairly sophisticated legal arguments,

citing cases

that

and the psychological evaluations (Aug.

is at

district court

denied

high risk t0 continue his criminal behavior unless he completes

mental health treatment and remains abstinent.

Both observed he could receive

while incarcerated or in the community.” (Aug. R.,

p. 171.)

“As

According to the Idaho Department 0f Correction Offender Search

satisﬁed on
5

The

motion and again explained the reasoning behind the sentence. “Both Dr. Sombke and Dr.

Jorgensen believed Black

4

R., pp. 138-56).5

March

that treatment

the presentence investigator

portal, that sentence Will

be

25, 2020.

In an Order Granting

Motion

to

Augment and

to

Suspend the Brieﬁng Schedule dated August

2019, this Court granted Black’s motion t0 augment the appellate record with materials
relevant to his Rule 35 motion. Those materials will be cited here in as “Aug. R.”
12,

found, he

from

is

getting treatment

city to city,

Boise.

It is

and

is

appropriately medicated.” (Id.) “Being an itinerant,

makes community treatment problematic.

also true that the longer he

prognosis for a crime free future.”
help rehabilitate him.”

(Id.)

The

is

(Id.)

Black has no

ties to

moving

Idaho 0r to

abstinent and being properly medicated, the better his

Thus, the court concluded, “continued conﬁnement will

district

judge explicitly stated

that, in arriving at the sentence,

she “considered Black’s character and any mitigating and aggravating factors. In mitigation, the

Court considered his mild retardation, mental health and his need for treatment.”

(Id.)

“The

Court, however, found there were several aggravating factors in this case like his lengthy

criminal history and itinerate lifestyle

171-72.)

0n

“In particular,

rehabilitation

it is

clear that

—

suggesting the need for this sentence.”

Black needs treatment and,

this Court’s sentence

and protection of society. Continuing his incarceration

and Will help him change

his behavior.” (Aug. R., p. 172.)

(Aug. R., pp.

facilitates that

focused

treatment

ISSUE
Black

states the issue

Whether the

0n appeal

as:

district court

abused

its

discretion

by not

acting consistently

with the applicable legal standards, which are rooted in the Eighth Amendment,
when it imposed Mr. Black’s sentence.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Black shown

that the district court

abused

sentence of ﬁve years ﬁxed?

10

its

sentencing discretion by imposing a

ARGUMENT
Black Failed T0 Show That The District Court Abused
A.

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Black was sentenced

ﬁve year ﬁxed term of imprisonment on a conviction

t0 a

count 0f criminal possession of a ﬁnancial transaction card.

for

one

In sentencing, the district court

focused 0n Black’s mental health, his mild intellectual disability, his substance abuse problem,
his itinerant lifestyle,

and his extensive criminal

history.

The

district

judge emphasized the

importance of the sentence for the protection of society, rehabilitation, and deterrence, noting that

Black was very likely

t0

resume

his long history

that his potential for rehabilitation

of crime and substance abuse

would be improved

if

is

Nevertheless, Black’s primary

that the district court failed t0 adequately consider his

a signiﬁcant factor at sentencing.

more than an

That argument

is

mental condition as

both contrary to the record and

is

invitation for this Court to reweigh the evidence before the district court.

remaining argument—that the

district court

somehow usurped

by imposing a wholly ﬁxed sentence—likewise

fails.

The

and

he had the long period of sobriety and

mental health treatment he could receive while incarcerated.

argument on appeal

if released,

nothing
Black’s

the authority 0f the Parole

district court

recognized

its

Board

discretion,

acknowledged and properly applied the governing law, carefully evaluated the considerations
before

it,

including Black’s mental health and intellectual disability, and crafted a sentence based

on those considerations.

B.

Standard

It

did not abuse

its

sentencing discretion.

Of Review

The length of a sentence
the defendant’s entire sentence.

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard considering

State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007)
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(citing Strand,

137 Idaho

Where

(2007)).

at

460, 50 P.3d at 475; State V. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838

a sentence

demonstrating that

it is

is

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of

a clear abuse of discretion.

State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d

The abuse 0f

614, 615 (2001) (citing State V. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

discretion test looks to whether the district court: “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of

discretion; (2) acted Within the outer boundaries

0f its discretion;

legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available t0

the exercise of reason.”

Lunneborg

V.

MV

Fun

Life, 163

it;

(3) acted consistently

and

(4)

reached

With the

decision

its

by

Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194

(2018).

C.

The Eighth Amendment
Black struggles

brief, pp. 12-13),

cases cited

to

Is

Not Implicated

In This

frame his argument in terms 0f the Eighth

but he has not shown that the Eighth

by Black

Case

are relevant here.

He

Amendment

is

Amendment

(Appellant’s

implicated.

None 0f the

points t0 cases of two types. First, he cites a

of cases involving application 0f the death penalty: Pengy

V.

Lmaugh, 492 U.S.

number

302, 340 (1989)

(holding that sentencers must be permitted to “consider and give effect t0 mitigating evidence of

mental retardation in imposing sentence” Where the death penalty
Atkins

V.

Virginia,

may be

536 U.S. 304 (2002); Atkins, 536 U.S.

at

imposed), abrogated by

320 (holding

that

it

is

unconstitutional to execute “mentally retarded criminals”); Tennard V. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 289

(2004) (holding that a habeas claim alleging that a jury that imposed the death penalty was not
permitted t0 appropriately consider evidence of intellectual disability as mitigating was
debatable and so a certiﬁcate of appealability should have issued).

12

at least

(Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)

Second, he points to

Graham

0f non-homicide offenses

V. Florida,

may not be

560 U.S. 48 (2010), Which held

sentenced to

life

that juveniles convicted

without the possibility 0f parole. Li.

This case involves neither the death penalty nor a juvenile sentenced to
possibility 0f parole, but instead involves a

stretching

three

Moreover, even

who was

decades

if the cases cited

at 82.

Without the

life

adult With a criminal record

sentence t0

a ﬁxed,

by Black could be read

ﬁve-year term of imprisonment.

Amendment

as holding that the Eighth

requires that evidence regarding the defendant’s mental condition be presented as potentially

mitigating in a case like this one, as discussed below, that evidence

extensively considered

by

the district court, and

court did not weigh that evidence as Black

D.

The

District Court

Did Not

would

was considered

like

was presented

mitigating.

That the

it

was

district

does not implicate the Eighth Amendment.

A

To Consider Black’s Mental Condition As

Fail

here,

Signiﬁcant

Factor At Sentencing

The applicable

legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court’s exercise

are well-established.

Where

0f demonstrating that

it is

a sentence

V.

Windom, 150 Idaho

873, 875, 253

Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).

does not dispute that his sentence

is

within the applicable statutory limits.

Therefore, t0 carry his burden, he must

facts.

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

a clear abuse of discretion. State V.

P.3d 310, 312 (2011); State

of the

is

of discretion

Windom, 150 Idaho

show

at 875,

the sentence

253 P.3d

at

is

E

Black

I.C. § 18-3 128(3).

excessive under any reasonable View

312

(citations omitted).

A

sentence

is

reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the primary obj ective 0f protecting society or any 0f
the related sentencing goals 0f deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Li. at 875-76, 253 P.3d at

312-13; Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d

at

615.
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“When

considering the sentence to be imposed, if the defendant’s mental condition

is

a

signiﬁcant issue, the sentencing judge must also weigh that mental condition as a sentencing

consideration.”

omitted).

152 Idaho 122, 132, 267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011) (citations

State V. Delling,

The defendant’s mental condition does

factor” in imposing sentence;

it is

not,

however, have t0 be the “controlling

only a consideration to be weighed by the

ﬂ alﬂ m,

other relevant considerations. Li. at 132-133, 267 P.3d at 719-720;

836-37, 264 P.3d at 943-44;

at 130,

306 P.3d

at

m1, 137 Idaho

at

461-62, 50 P.3d

district court

at

476-77; Quintana, 155 Idaho

is

a factual determination for the district court.

aggravating 0r mitigating and that the determination which

by a defendant

in a

aggravation and mitigation.” (quoting

murder case

Pm,

is

492 U.S.

court determines that the defendant’s mental condition

“place[] greater emphasis”

rehabilitate the defendant,

The

is

precisely

district

a factual ﬁnding for the district

at 324)).

is

But even where a sentencing

mitigating, the district judge

as the

and deter future criminal conduct. Strand, 137 Idaho

what happened

may

still

need t0 protect the public,
at

462, 50 P.3d

here.

judge here explicitly and repeatedly stated that she considered Black’s mental
(2/21/19 Tr., p. 40, Ls. 9-15; p. 42, Ls. 4-5; Aug.

She ordered a new psychological evaluation and asked Black

medical and mental health records. (12/6/18
set out in I.C. §

either

a ‘tWO-edged sword,’ relevant to both

0n other considerations, such

condition as a signiﬁcant factor at sentencing.

R., p. 171.)

may be

146 Idaho 720, 726, 202 P.3d 642, 648 (2008) (“Evidence 0f 10W

court); Pizzuto V. State,

intelligence offered

is

is

State V. Porter, 130

Idaho 772, 789, 948 P.2d 127, 144 (1997) (holding that mental health issues

477. That

151 Idaho at

215. Likewise, whether an intellectual disability or mental health condition

aggravating or mitigating

at

with

Tr., p. 6, L. 5

—

p. 7, L. 18.)

t0

submit any pertinent

She recited the

factors

19-2523(1) and stated that she had applied them to determine an appropriate

14

sentence.

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 40, L. 16

—

p. 41, L. 6.)

She ﬁlled approximately nine pages of the

sentencing transcript carefully discussing Black’s mental health, mild intellectual disability,

substance abuse issues, and the psychological evaluations.

she concluded that Black had a mild intellectual disability,

the psychological evaluations,

depression,

treatment.

anxiety,

and a substance abuse problem, and that he was currently receiving

(2/21/19 T11, p. 49, L. 21

—

p. 50, L. 16.)

She

explicitly stated that she considered his

mental health and intellectual disability as mitigating (Aug. R.,
retribution

40, L. 8).

Based on

(2/21/19 Tr., pp. 42-50.)

would not play a

p.

171),

and determined

role in her sentencing determination (2/21/19 Tr., p. 39, L.

However, she found

that the ﬁve-year

ﬁxed sentence was necessary

24 —

p.

t0 ensure the

protection of society in light 0f his extraordinarily long criminal history and to provide Black

with the best chance to rehabilitate and avoid a reversion to his long-standing pattern of criminal

conduct and substance abuse, particularly in light of his itinerate
in the

community unlikely

to

be successful.

lifestyle

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 61, L. 18

thoroughly considered Black’s mental condition as a signiﬁcant factor

it

was

Idaho

mitigating, but also determined that other factors

at 837,

264 P.3d

at

944 (holding

mental health as a signiﬁcant factor

at

Which made treatment

—

p. 64, L.

at sentencing,

weighed more heavily.

18.)

She

determined

E m,

151

that district court did not fail t0 adequately consider

sentencing where

it

order a psychological evaluation,

discussed at least one factor set out in LC. § 19-25230), and weighed the defendant’s mental
health as a consideration in determining an appropriate sentence).

Black’s primary argument 0n appeal
district court

is that,

despite

all

appearances t0 the contrary, the

did not really consider his mental health as a signiﬁcant factor because

weigh the sentencing
district court asserted

factors as

it

he would have done.

did not

(Appellant’s brief, p. 14 (“Though the

would be considering Mr. Black’s

15

it

intellectual disability as a signiﬁcant

factor, its

subsequent explanations 0f the sentence demonstrate

(citations omitted)).)

0f

[his]

brief,

p.

(2)

was not

actually doing so.”

In particular, he claims that the district court: (1) “focused

condition as a reason that his intellectual disability

15);

it

“downplayed the signiﬁcance 0f

was not

0n the

significant” (Appellant’s

intellectual disability

[his]

severity

based 0n

its

conclusion that his criminal conduct was deliberate rather than impulsive” (Appellant’s brief, pp.
18

(internal

quotation marks

omitted»;

consideration to [his] intellectual disability”

goals motivating

its

“demonstrated

(3)

by considering

it

was not giving signiﬁcant

the protection 0f society as one 0f the

sentence (Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-22); and, (4) improperly relied on a

recommendation from the presentence investigator regarding sentencing (Appellant’s
22-24).

In each case, Black misconstrues the record

below and,

preserve any objection to any alleged recommendation
addition, he is simply asking this Court t0

do what

it

by

has said

brief, pp.

as t0 the last, he failed t0

the presentence investigator.

it

Will not

do—reweigh

In

the district

court’s discretionary sentencing determination.

E

(where defendant claimed that the

inadequately considered his mental health issues

at sentencing,

district court

holding that “our role

court”); State V.

is

Windom, 150 Idaho

at

879, 253 P.3d at 316

not t0 reweigh the evidence considered by the district

Thurlow, 152 Idaho 256, 261, 269 P.3d 813, 818

(Ct.

App. 2011) (“Thurlow

requests that this Court reweigh the evidence presented before the district court and arrive at a

different conclusion.

However,

as

mentioned above,

established standards 0f review”).
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t0

d0 so would be contrary

t0

our

The

1.

District

Was Not
Disability Was Mild

Court Did Not Conclude That Black’s Intellectual Disability

A Signiﬁcant Factor At Sentencing Because His Intellectual
Black argues that the

district court erred

was not

as a reason his intellectual disability

assertion

is

by “focus[ing] on
signiﬁcant.”

the severity of [his] condition

mistaken in several ways.

First,

both 0f the experts

Who

provided psychological evaluations of Black characterized

his disability as “mildly intellectual disabled” 0r having a “mild intellectual disability.”

8;

Sombke

the

That

(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)

That the

Eval., p. 9.)

way both

experts did

is

(PSI, p.

district court characterized his intellectual disability in exactly

hardly evidence that the district court did not consider his intellectual

disability as a signiﬁcant factor at sentencing, or that

it

“downplay[ed]” his intellectual

disability.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)

Second, Black relies 0n
court

was required

m1

as support for the proposition that while the district

t0 consider his intellectual disability in sentencing,

considering the nature or severity of his disability.

m1

intellectual disability in mitigation

not relevant to

78.

The

its

m1,

Unsurprisingly,

a habeas petitioner argued

be overturned because he had presented evidence of an

and the jury was effectively instructed

that that evidence

m1, 542

was

U.S. at 276-

Fifth Circuit refused to grant a certiﬁcate of appealability in part because “evidence of

constitute a uniquely severe condition” that

relevant’ mitigating evidence.”

features

In

determination whether to impose the death penalty.

10W IQ alone does not

Cir.)).

was prohibited from

(Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)

does not stand for or support that proposition.

that his capital conviction should

it

Addressing that

Li. at

issue, the

and circumstances

281 (quoting Tennard

Supreme Court noted

that a panel

it

V. Cockrell,

was

was

4

“constitutionally

284 F.3d 591, 595 (5th

incorrect to say that “only those

of federal appellate judges deems t0 be ‘severe’

17

(let

alone

‘uniquely severe’) could have such a tendency” t0 mitigate a defendant’s culpability so as t0 be
relevant to the application 0f the death penalty. Tennard, 542 U.S. at 286. “Rather, the question

is

simply Whether the evidence

is

of such a character that

less than death.” Li. (internal quotation

habeas petition were

But

it

might serve as a basis for a sentence

marks omitted). Thus,

it

concluded that the merits of the

debatable and a certiﬁcate 0f appealability should have issued.

at least

that holding is irrelevant here for several reasons.

mitigation in death penalty cases and this

is

First,

it is

focused on evidence in

Second, and more

not a death penalty case.

importantly, Tennard suggested only that evidence of an intellectual disability

even

if the disability is

whether

to

Li. at 286.

did not suggest in any

It

error for the jury (or, a judge) to consider the character

in

may be

deemed not “uniquely severe” and should be considered

impose the death penalty.

determining the extent t0 which the evidence

and severity 0f the

is

mitigating,

Li

way

mitigating

in determining

that

it

would be

intellectual disability

if at

The contrary

all.

suggestion—that While a judge 0r jury must consider the existence of an intellectual disability in

pronouncing a sentence,
correct.

If the existence

disability surely is too.

it

cannot consider the nature and extent of that disability—cannot be

of an intellectual disability

is

relevant t0 culpability, the severity of that

If intellectual disability affects culpability, a

intellectual disability is less culpable than a defendant

things being equal.

the district court did

how,

if at

all,

it

with a mild intellectual

Despite Black repeatedly characterizing the

his intellectual ability 0r as concluding that

is

rely

it

defendant With a severe

district court as

was not a signiﬁcant

sentence.

inappropriate.
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Nothing in

“downplaying”

factor at sentencing, all that

on the evidence regarding the nature of the

would impact Black’s

disability, all

disability to determine

m1

suggests that

was

Next, Black points to the

district court’s

discussion 0f United States V. Larson, 558 F.

Supp. 2d 1103 (D. Mont. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 346 F. App’x 166 (9th Cir. 2009),

showing

as allegedly

(Appellant’s brief, pp.

that the district court erred.

While

16-17.)

— p.

addressing the district court at sentencing, Black cited Larson. (2/21/19 Tr., p. 27, L. 23

L. 12.)

In Larson, a federal district court refused to

sentence after the defendant

the defendant

impose a ﬁve-year mandatory minimum

was convicted of receiving and possessing

child pornography

had “severe adaptive functioning deﬁcits” and a “profound deﬁcit

adaptive functioning.”

Li. at 1111-12.6

Where

in the area

of

Just prior to discussing her rationale for imposing the

sentence she did, the district judge here distinguished
“profoundly, intellectually disabled,” while Black

Tr., p. 36, Ls. 3-9.)

28,

m,

noting that the defendant there was

was “mildly

intellectually disabled.”

Contrary t0 Black’s suggestion 0n appeal, this

(2/21/19

comment does not

suggest

that the district court “failed t0 give [Black’s intellectual disability] the signiﬁcant consideration

required by the applicable legal standards.”
district court

(Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)

It

shows only

that the

recognized a distinction between Black and the defendant in Larson and did not

take Larson as controlling 0r even persuasive authority With respect to Black’s sentence.7

Black further suggests that the

and the defendant
district court

in Larson.

did so.

as having a “severe”

6

The portion of

United States
7

Of

V.

As

district court

exaggerated the distinction between himself

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17.)

The record does not reﬂect

described in Larson, the defendant was a

and “profound” deﬁcit

Larson, 346 F.

App’x

described

in adaptive functioning, as

the district court’s decision addressed t0 sentencing

that the

having a “signiﬁcantly

was vacated on

appeal.

166, 169 (9th Cir. 2009).

course, setting aside the factual distinctions between Larson and this case, as a federal

district court

opinion that was vacated 0n appeal in relevant part, Larson was not binding 0n the

district court

and

is

not binding on this Court.
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impaired” ability t0 reason, as “lack[ing] abstract reasoning,” as unable to maintain his hygiene,

and as living

and

in trash

Larson, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1106-07, 1111-12.

feces.

memory and

Tests revealed

that

he had “impaired

that

he had very impaired mental ﬂexibility, and exhibit[ed] deﬁcits in executive functioning.”

Li. at

1111 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Who was

Sombke

Eval., pp. 4-5.)

He had

arguments (2/21/19

m,

By

contrast,

Black

is

.

.

.

and

man

a

described in two psychological evaluations as having a “mild” intellectual disability.

Both evaluators described Black

legal

learning abilities, and indicated brain dysfunction.

as polite, friendly, well-groomed,

only just addressed the

Tr., p. 24, L.

7

—

district court,

p. 35, L. 17),

he claimed t0 have located himself (2/21/19

that

district court

and

articulate.

making

(PSI, p. 5;

fairly sophisticated

with references t0 case law, including
Tr., p. 27, L.

23 —

p. 30, L. 11).

The

reasonably concluded that there was a factual distinction between the severity 0f the

disability suffered

by Black and by the defendant

in

m.

But, regardless, even if the district court erred in that regard,

it

certainly does not follow

that the district court failed t0 consider Black’s intellectual disability as a signiﬁcant factor at

sentencing.

It

did so by extensively discussing his intellectual disability and mental health issues

and considering them When

setting Black’s sentence.

The

district court’s recognition that the

psychological evaluations characterized Black’s intellectual disability as mild in no

way

suggests

that the district court did not consider his intellectual disability as a signiﬁcant factor at

sentencing, and neither does the fact that

2.

The

District

Court

it

did not consider

intellectual disability

based 0n

district

its

as persuasive authority.

Did Not Minimize Black’s

Concluding That His Criminal Conduct
Black argues that the

M

Intellectual

Disability

BV

Was Deliberate

court “repeatedly

downplayed the signiﬁcant of

[his]

conclusion that his criminal conduct was ‘deliberate’ rather

20

than ‘impulsive.’”

(Appellant’s brief, p. 18 (quoting 2/21/19 Tr., p. 45 Ls. 14-21).)

comments

the district court’s

was saying

is

that

dramatically, Black claims that, “Basically,

Mr. Black’s

what the

intellectual disability did not affect his culpability

Recasting

district court

because he was

able to act deliberately.” (Id.)

The

judge concluded that these particular crimes were not crimes of impulse

district

because they were planned and represented a pattern 0f conduct for Black.
Ls. 5-9.)

and

Black would “enter a public building and g0 through people’s purses,

credit cards

would have a
have the

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 53,

and

their cash.”

He would

(Id.)

steal their debit

“take these credit cards and in

some cases he

taxi waiting outside the public building.” (2/21/19 T11, p. 53, Ls. 9-14.)

taxi take

him

t0 a store,

Where he would purchase

gift

cards until the stolen credit card

stopped working before discarding that credit card and moving 0n to the next.
53, Ls. 14-17.)

As

He would

the district judge noted, the purchase of gift cards

(2/21/19 Tr., p.

was “very smart” because

they are fungible, like cash, and because he can then discard the stolen credit cards. (2/21/19

p. 53, L.

21

— p.

Black would then use a card

54, L. 4.)

he would engage in similar conduct. (2/21/19

The

district court’s

suggests that

it

t0 purchase travel to another state

conclusion that Black’s conduct was deliberate and planned in no

may be

In the ﬁrst place, the requirement to consider mental health or intellectual

E m,

130 Idaho

at

either aggravating or mitigating

the district court).

way

and mental health as a signiﬁcant

disability as a signiﬁcant factor is not a requirement that they

circumstances.

where

Tr., p. 54, Ls. 5-10.)

failed t0 consider his intellectual disability

factor at sentencing.

Tr.,

Thus, even

was not mitigating because

be taken as mitigating under the

789, 948 P.2d at 144 (holding that mental health issues

and

that the determination

if the district court

the crimes at issue

is

a factual ﬁnding for

concluded that Black’s intellectual disability

were planned and

21

Which

deliberate,

it

would not follow

that the district court erred.

The cases

(Appellant’s brief, pp.

contrary.

by Black—Pﬂry and

cited

about mitigation
274;

my,

condition

is

when

is

is

entitled t0 consider

appropriate; they say nothing about

faced with evidence of a particular

The extent

492 U.S. 302.

not to the

Again, they are cases addressed to the evidence

18-19.)

regarding intellectual disability that a district court

whether the death penalty

M—are

t0

sort.

When determining

What the jury must conclude

E

generally Tennard, 542 U.S.

Which evidence regarding the defendant’s mental

mitigating under the circumstances

for the district court.

is

m m,

15 1 Idaho at

837, 264 P.3d at 944; Quintana, 155 Idaho at 131, 306 P.3d at 216 (holding that district court did

not err by determining that mental health issues were not mitigating under the circumstances).

But neither does the

district court’s

reﬂected a pattern 0f conduct suggest that
Indeed, the district court stated that

p. 171),

L.

24 —

and

that

it

was not taking

p. 40, L. 8).

did not take his intellectual disability as mitigating.

considered his intellectual disability as mitigating (Aug. R.,

retribution as a sentencing goal in this case (2/21/19 Tr., p. 39,

As Black himself notes, an

Where the underlying conduct was
district court

it

it

observation that these crimes were deliberate and

deliberate.

intellectual disability

may be

mitigating even

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-19.) Therefore, that the

took the conduct here t0 be deliberate and not impulsive does not suggest that

it

did

not consider Black’s intellectual disability as mitigating.

Nor does Black show
evaluations.

He

points

to

that the district court

Dr.

Jorgensen’s

evaluation

(Appellant’s brief, p. 19 (citing PSI, pp. 8-10).)

psychological evaluation reﬂected that Black

p. 47, Ls. 3-7.)

rather, she

The

district

is

somehow misunderstood

But the

noting

that

the psychological

Black

district court

is

impulsive.

recognized that the

prone to impulsivity. (2/21/19

Tr., p. 45, Ls. 4-5;

judge did not take issue With the suggestion that Black

is

impulsive,

concluded that the crimes for which he was being sentenced were not impulsive in the

22

sense that they were unplanned.

(2/21/19 TL, p. 52, L. 17

—

these crimes were planned and represented a pattern of conduct

proposition that Black

The proposition

p. 53, L. 4.)

is

that

perfectly consistent with the

prone to impulsivity, and nothing in the psychological evaluations

is

contravenes the district court’s conclusion that these particular crimes were planned and
represented a pattern 0f conduct.

The

3.

District

Court Did Not Improperly Focus

Black argues that the

district court’s

was not giving signiﬁcant consideration

to

On The Protection Of Society

focus 0n the protection 0f society “demonstrated

Mr. Black’s

it

intellectual disability as a mitigating

factor.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 20.)

The

court focused 0n the protection 0f society, Black’s rehabilitation, and

district

deterrence, all in light of his mental condition and substance abuse problem.

L. 2

—

p. 64, L. 18.)

result in

It

{2/21/19 Tr., p. 62,

determined that releasing Black into the community earlier would likely

Black reverting

abuse and committing additional crimes, that he needed

to substance

signiﬁcant consequences t0 be associated with his conduct, and that he

would have an

opportunity While incarcerated t0 stay sober, receive mental health treatment, and receive

programming

that

would be beneﬁcial

t0 him. (Id.)

Contrary t0 Black’s argument on appeal, the
applicable law.

all

He

again cites

Graham

other considerations, lest the Eighth

a nullity.”’

district court

acted in accordance with

for the proposition that, “‘Incapacitation cannot override

Amendment’s

rule against disproportionate sentences

(Appellant’s brief, p. 20 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 73.).)

be

But, ﬁrst, and again,

Graham held only

that juvenile offenders sentenced for a

sentenced to

prison Without the possibility of parole, noting both that juvenile offenders

are

life in

“more capable of change than

are adults”

and a

23

life

non-homicide offense

sentence

is

effectively a

may

much

not be

longer

Graham, 560 U.S.

sentence for a juvenile than for an adult.

68-70, 82.

certainly does not stand for the proposition that a district court

may

protection 0f society as a legitimate sentencing goal Where the defendant has

issues.

Second, this Court has held

order and protection 0f society.

that,

spree.

some mental

health

the

is

good

A11 other factors are, and must be, subservient t0 that end.”

Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)). That

may be an

a case

is

never consider the

“‘The primary [sentencing] consideration

State V. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500, 861 P.2d 67,

society

This

man, and a three-decade long crime

involving a ﬁve-year sentence, a

Graham

at

is,

7O (1993) (quoting State

this

V.

Moore, 78

Court has held that the protection of

Third, the district court did not focus only

overriding consideration.

0n the

protection 0f society, but also focused signiﬁcantly on Black’s rehabilitation, concluding that a

longer term of imprisonment, sobriety, and mental health treatment would be beneﬁcial for him.

Next, Black appears t0 suggest that the

district

rehabilitation in determining an appropriate sentence.

from

directly contrary to countless cases

this

court

was not

entitled to consider

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 20-21.)

Court addressing sentencing.

E

That

is

State V. Bailey,

161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (“‘The objectives of criminal punishment are
protection of society, deterrence of the individual and the public, possibility afrehabilitation, and

punishment or retribution for wrongdoing, with the primary objective being the protection of
society.”’

(2016))).

(emphasis added) (quoting State

Black does not explain

sentencing, while

it

is

how

V.

Jimenez, 160 Idaho 540, 544, 376 P.3d 744, 748

rehabilitation could

“irrational” (Appellant’s brief, p. 20)

be one 0f the central goals 0f

and an abuse of discretion

consider What sentence will most effectively result in rehabilitation. Instead, he cites only

V.

United States, 564 U.S. 3 19 (201

Supreme Court held

1) (cited at

that the plain language

to

Em

Appellant’s brief, p. 21), a case in Which the U.S.

of a federal sentencing
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statute, 18

U.S.C. § 3582(a),

“prevents a [federal] sentencing court from imposing 0r lengthening a prison term because the
court thinks an offender will beneﬁt from a prison treatment program.” Li. at 334.

statute, its plain

Finally,

language, and

hm

are

Wholly irrelevant to Black’s sentence and

Black suggests that the psychological evaluations show that the

That federal

this appeal.

district court

mistaken in concluding that the sentence would support his rehabilitation. (Appellant’s

was

brief, pp.

21-22.)

First,

even

if

he were

right, the district court also

necessary to protect society and for deterrence.

framed

was

may be

—

all

incorrect that

is

879, 253 P.3d at 316.

unreasonable 0r incorrect.
supportive

appears

804 P.2d

the sentencing goals” and

not Whether the district court was incorrect, but Whether

“reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as did the district court.”

at

it

sufﬁcient”).

In addition, the standard

Idaho

The

p. 64, L. 18.)

State V. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241,

1369, 1372 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that “a sentence need not serve

“one

sentencing decision as

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 63, L. 5

sentence would therefore be reasonable even if the district court

necessary t0 accomplish Black’s rehabilitation.

its

environment,

He
and

Black has not shown

Windom, 150

that the district court

was

points to Dr. Jorgensen stating that, “‘Incarceration

long

term

incarceration

often

has

negative

either

is

not a

cognitive

and

psychological effects 0n those incarcerated’” (Appellant’s brief, p. 21 (quoting PSI, p. 10)), as

well as Dr.

Sombke

stating that treatment for depression generally involves both medication

counselling, the latter of which

Sombke

Eval., p. 7)).

is

less available in prison (Appellant’s brief, p.

However, Dr. Jorgensen also noted

his substance abuse since

abuse

may be

he has been incarcerated.

that

and

22 (quoting

Black has been in remission from

(PSI, p. 9.)

She noted

that his substance

a primary driver of his paranoia, distrust of others, and impaired judgment and decision

25

making

abilities.

(Id.)

Black himself stated the same and attributed his poor decision—making

and thirty—year criminal spree
incarceration

is

to his addiction.

(PSI, p. 47.)

While Dr. Jorgensen did note

that

not a “supportive” environment, she did so in the context of recommending

counselling and programming that Black could receive While incarcerated.

(PSI, p. 10.)

She

noted that Black was being treated for his mental health issues while incarcerated and that the
treatment

was proving beneﬁcial.

Likewise, Dr.

(PSI, p. 11.)

Sombke noted

that the substance

abuse treatment Black needed, as well as programming and counselling, was available “in the

community and
counseling

(Sombke

also in an incarcerated setting.”

may be more

Eval., p. 7.)

Though he

also noted that

available in the community, the district court reasonably concluded that,

given Black’s transient lifestyle and his history 0f crime and drug abuse, he was unlikely t0

remain sober and receive the appropriate treatment
p. 64, Ls. 2-18;

ﬂ

if released into the

community. (2/21/19

Tr.,

211$ PSI, p. 47 (While he had previously tried treatment in the community, he

“‘never stayed in treatment 9” (quoting B1ack)).)

The

district court

reasonably concluded that a

longer period of incarceration provided the best opportunity for long-term sobriety, treatment,

and programming, which
4.

is

What both Drs. Jorgensen and Sombke

stated that he needed.

AnV Obiection T0 The Content Of The Presentence
And Has Not Shown That The District Court Erred By Relying On A

Black Has Not Preserved
Report

Sentencing Recommendation

Black argues that the

From The Presentence

district court relied

from the presentence investigator and

that

Investigator

0n an improper sentencing recommendation

such reliance demonstrates that the

district court

did

not properly consider his intellectual disability as mitigating. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 22-24.)

First,

The

Black has not preserved any objection

district court

t0 the content

of the presentence materials.

speciﬁcally asked the parties Whether they had reviewed the presentence

materials and whether there

was any objection

t0 them.
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(2/21/19 Tr., p.

5, L.

10

—

p. 6, L. 10.)

Black’s attorney responded that he had reviewed them and had n0 obj ection.

(Id.)

“A

defendant,

given a reasonable opportunity to review a presentence investigation report prior t0 sentencing,

may

not challenge

its

adequacy for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal.” State

Black attempts t0 circumvent his

624, 851 P.2d 336, 338 (1993).

arguing that he

is

Matteson, 123 Idaho 622,

failure t0 object

below by

objecting to the district court’s reliance on the alleged recommendation, not

inclusion in the PSI.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 23 n.10.)

that appellate courts in Idaho

argument that

V.

district court

That

have repeatedly rejected.

is

its

a distinction Without a difference

EQ

(refusing to consider appellant’s

W

erroneously relied on information improperly included in presentence

report because the appellant

had not objected below

to the information being included);

Banuelos, 124 Idaho 569, 575, 861 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Ct. App. 1993) (refusing t0 consider claim
that district court erred

by considering adverse information

in the presentence report “because

Banuelos did not avail himself 0f the opportunity t0 object

to,

explain or rebut this adverse

information at the sentencing hearing, this issue has not been preserved for appellate review”).

defendant cannot decline t0 object to the presentence report only to object to the

Black

consideration of the presentence report.

(201

1),

as a case in

to consider a

Which the Idaho Supreme Court suggested

it

district court’s

151 Idaho 576, 595-96

was improper

for a district court

recommendation by the presentence investigator regarding a particular sentence.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 23.) But, in

an objection below.

m,

m,

the Court

was

careful t0 emphasize that there

had been

151 Idaho at 595 n.8.

Nor has Black attempted
recommendation was ﬁmdamental
V. Baxter,

cites State V. Draper,

A

t0

argue

error.

He

0n appeal

that

the

inclusion

0f the alleged

has therefore waived any such argument.

Em

163 Idaho 231, 236, 409 P.3d 811, 816 (2018) (holding that argument regarding

unobjected-to error

was

“futile”

where appellant had “not argued
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for fundamental error review”);

State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,

970 (1996) (“When issues on appeal are not

supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be considered”). Even

if

he had made the argument, the inclusion of the information would not constitute fundamental
error.

First,

it

does not Violate an un-waived constitutional

right.

E

Matteson, 123 Idaho

at

624, 851 P.2d at 338 (holding that fundamental error review does not apply t0 claim, raised for
the ﬁrst time

and

on appeal,

district court

that information should not

should not have considered

not plain 0n the face 0f the record because

it).

it is

have been included in the presentence report

Second, as discussed below, the alleged error
not clear at

sentencing recommendation in the presentence report.

all that

The record does not
investigator.

“The

results

clearly reﬂect

an improper

district court’s

sentencing

alleged sentencing recommendation.

any improper recommendation from the presentence

In an update t0 the presentence report previously issued, the investigator stated,

0f the psychological evaluation [completed by Dr. Jorgensen] likewise do not seem

t0 justify deviation

constitute a

way 0n the

is

Third, and ﬁnally, as discussed below,

Black cannot establish that any error was not harmless because the
discussion did not focus in any substantial

there even

is

from the Court’s

recommendation

that

original sentence.”

some

(PSI, p. 2.)

But

that

comment does not

particular sentence be imposed.

Even

if the

new

psychological evaluation did not “appear” to provide reason to deviate, the presentence
investigator could well have thought that the original sentence

that factors

t0

begin With, or

and information other than the new psychological evaluation justiﬁed deviating from

the original sentence.

makes

was excessive

In fact, the very next sentence written

the only recommendation she provided:

recommended.”

(Id.)

There

is

“A

by

the presentence investigator

continued period 0f incarceration

is

therefore

nothing improper about that recommendation. I.C.R. 32(0) (“The
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presentence

report

may recommend

but

incarceration

recommendations concerning the length 0f incarceration

Nor
that

it

is

.

.

should

not

somehow

on

this statement, or

failed t0 adequately consider Black’s intellectual disability because

presentence investigator.

speciﬁc

contain

.”).

there any indication that the district court relied signiﬁcantly

The sentencing hearing includes only two very

it.

.

it

it

brief references to the statement

(2/21/19 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 10-23; p. 61, Ls. 18-198)

It

relied

0n

from the

instead focused

extensively 0n Black’s mental condition, substance abuse, itinerate lifestyle, and criminal history.

The

district court’s

even

if the

discussion

makes

clear that

it

would have made

same sentencing decision

the

presentence investigator had not written the single sentence t0 Which Black obj ects for

the ﬁrst time

0n appeal.

investigator’s supposed

Black’s only argument t0 the contrary

recommendation necessarily “infused

the error that permeated the original sentence

—

that

it

is

that the presentence

[the district court’s] decision

was imposed Without giving

consideration t0 his intellectual disability.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-24.)

with

requisite

The previous

judge’s error was t0 refuse to address 0r consider Black’s mental condition at sentencing.

district

M

ﬂ, 2018

WL 49403 10, at *5.

Black

arguing that the sentence imposed by the district judge here must be erroneous because

is

the

is

The

same sentence imposed by

district

judge here certainly did not do

What was

error

was

the

manner

judge reached the sentence, not the sentence in fact reached.
demonstrated, the sentence in fact reached

Again,

T0

the extent that

it

the previous district judge, that argument misconstrues the error

identiﬁed by the Court 0f Appeals.

8

that.

is

Black did not object when the

in

which the previous

As

district

the district judge here

reasonable and furthers the applicable sentencing

district

investigator’s statement.
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court

commented 0n

the

presentence

goals under the circumstances, and in particular in light of Black’s mental condition, substance

abuse problem, and history 0f criminal conduct.

E.

To Impose A Wholly Fixed Sentence Was
Reasonable And Did Not Usurp Any Power Given T0 The Parole Board
The

District

Finally,

Court’s

Determination

Black argues that the

district court failed to exercise

authority constitutionally given t0 the Parole Board”

reason and “usurped the

by imposing a Wholly ﬁxed

sentence.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 24.)

He

claims that the district court failed t0 exercise reason because

it

determined that

“providing an opportunity for release 0n parole would be meaningless due to Oregon’s detainer

on him.” (Appellant’s

brief, p. 24.)

Black appears t0 argue that such a determination would be

unreasonable because he could have been sent to Oregon through an interstate compact to
address his charges there even while on parole, and, in

fact,

the district court could have

conditioned his parole 0n securing an interstate compact. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-259)

But the portion 0f the

transcript, the district court

noted that Black has no

ties to

Idaho, that he

him

in

In that portion of the

is

being kept sober and

receiving medical and mental health treatment while incarcerated, and that he

“releasing

9

by Black does not concern an Oregon detainer

(Appellant’s brief, p. 24 (citing 2/21/19 T11, p. 64, Ls. 2-18).)

any way.

is

transcript cited

is

transient

and

early will not ensure he gets the proper treatment.” (2/21/19 T11, p. 64, Ls. 2-18.)

Black’s argument that the district court could have conditioned his parole on securing an

interstate

compact

is at least

a

little

the authority of the Parole Board.

ironic in light 0f Black’s charge that the district court usurped

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-26.)

As

discussed below, imposing

ﬁxed sentence does not usurp any authority of the Parole Board. But, what would usurp
the authority of the Parole Board would be a district court imposing an indeterminate sentence
While attempting t0 impose conditions 0n the Parole Board’s discretion to grant parole during
a wholly

that sentence.
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That

is,

the district court

sobriety, treatment,

and

was concerned With ensuring
programming, which

signiﬁcantly less likely if Black

it

was released 0n

Black had an extended period 0f

that

thought necessary for his rehabilitation and

parole.

did not state that parole would be

It

“meaningless” in light 0f a detainer.
Black’s argument that the district court

fares

n0

better.

Black’s View, apparently,

appropriate candidate for parole

is

is

authority to impose a sentence of

is,

Board of the

0n Black’s View, a

Likewise, presumably,

district court

it

would usurp

and

210A(2) (subject

LC.

to “decide

to

eligibility is

board of correction,

it

when

district court

the Parole Board’s

determined by the

who

is eligible

On

two years

Black’s View, the only

one. Needless t0 say, there

discretion t0 grant parole only

district court’s sentence.

for parole

the

ﬂ

I.C. §

20-

commission 0f pardons and parole

may be

released on parole”); LC. § 19-

a district court sentences an offender t0 the custody 0f the state

must specify a minimum period of conﬁnement during Which the offender

not eligible for parole, and

The

The Parole Board has

§ 19-2513, granting authority t0 the

whether any prisoner

2513(1) (providing that

is

was a Wholly indeterminate

to support Black’s argument.

t0 eligible offenders

an

can apparently never

ﬁve years with two years ﬁxed because, during

sentence the district court could impose

no authority

is

ability to exercise that discretion.

ﬁxed, the Parole Board would be robbed 0f its power to grant parole.

is

an inmate

vested in the Parole Board and, by imposing a Wholly ﬁxed

That

impose a Wholly ﬁxed sentence.

the Parole Board’s authority

that the discretion to determine that

sentence, the district court deprived the Parole

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-26.)

somehow usurped

may

specify an additional indeterminate period during which he

did not usurp any authority 0f the Parole Board.
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is).

CONCLUSION
The

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of the

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

district court.

12th day of December, 2019.
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Andrew V. Wake

ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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